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will examine the current state of Army Transportation following over a decade of war.
The analysis begins with priorities for reset and overall cost of equipment and personnel to sustain Army Transportation Systems for future, twenty-first-century operations.
These analyses will identify gaps and provide recommendations to eliminate needless redundancies. Finally, transportation planning must anticipate future problems and challenges in order to streamline and synchronize transportation systems for joint operations in support of GCCs.
Army Transportation Systems in a Twenty-First Century Joint Operational Environment
When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time it will dull your forces and blunt your edge . . . If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient. Transportation of provisions itself consumes 20 times the amount transported.
-Sun Tzu
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. military adapted to change, operating more than ever in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment. This adaptation added depth and complexity to military operational decisions. The U.S. military transportation system is an essential element in strategic planning to operate successfully, while itself subject to the JIIM environment. Military leaders must constantly assess the dynamics of the changing environment; adaptation and innovation are especially important in the pressing economic times of the twenty-first century.
Increasingly joint transportation systems rely on information operations that are highly vulnerable to adversaries attempting to disrupt logistics lines and penetrate U.S. The Joint Force Commander's operational environment is the composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyber space). Included with-in these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations. 2 Army transportation systems in a joint operational environment must integrate and synchronize with other service components to a greater degree in order to continue closing gaps in efficiency, while maintaining the ability to meet the needs of all GCCs in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The U.S. Army must continue to take action streamlining both aged and modern transportation systems, focusing to achieve joint effects more effectively and efficiently given the latest fiscal challenges.
Army Transportation Commander's ability to integrate railroad SME with the HN to facilitate effective measures and best solutions for operational rail issues.
The ERC has the potential to achieve new levels of joint and interagency synergies in theater. DOD rail is a capability rarely tapped for operations in recent decades. Leveraging HN rail capability and capacity to the maximum extent could reduce demand on scarce Army truck resources in a deployed theater. The total number of Army wheeled vehicles is approximately 265,000 as of May 2012. 25 Some 34,082 of these are heavy-lift trucks. 26 In an effort to reduce inventory and reset for future operations, the Army is framing efficiency and effectiveness of this They fall under sustain. Upon reduction there will be 2,131 HETs for future operations. 30 The result will be the upgraded M1070A1 with several enhancements. Transfer Company (ICTC). 37 The Army currently has fifteen MCBs, five AC and ten USAR. 38 The MCB can be assigned to a Sustainment Brigade, Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), or a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) according to doctrine. Almost always the MCB will be assigned to the highest-level of sustainment command operating in a theater operation, highlighting its tactical, operational and The last decade of war has highlighted several challenges in Army movement control, Overall, these issues concern how the MCB and its MCTs do not train as they would fight due to structural shortfalls, training deficiencies, joint interoperability challenges, and AC-RC separation. In short, these units are not used for their designed capability during peacetime, garrison operations.
Recent operations often exceeded the MCB's doctrinal span of control of four to ten MCTs and potentially another company to some ten to twenty-seven MCTs. 
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The forthcoming change in effective command and control of Army watercraft will posture these low-density units for better effectiveness. Army rail assets are exploring initiatives to assist the GCCs more effectively from steady-state through contingency operations.
The Army's movement control battalions and subordinate teams have taken considerable space in this paper. The analysis has made several recommendations in several areas.
The US Army's strong commitment to meet the ongoing and emerging needs of the Joint Services is clear, especially to demonstrate genuine joint interdependence and cross-domain synergy. This paper has reviewed how the Army is laying the groundwork to achieve greater internal efficiencies while ensuring joint effectiveness. Integration has been and will continue to be through synchronized effort with other service components and government agencies to procure the right and most cost-effective method of distribution that meets the theater-strategic requirements of the GCCs. Army
Transportation Systems are part of the solution to joint readiness through continued, incremental steps.
Arguing for greater integration and synchronization by Army component and by Service are not radical proposals. The challenge will be the flexibility to see the potential in a period of great financial austerity.
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